Houses as collateral: has the link between house prices and consumption in the U.K. changed? commentary by Simon Gilchrist
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2002 179
Overview
he paper by Kosuke Aoki, James Proudman, and Gertjan 
Vlieghe considers the link between housing prices and 
consumption in a model where housing equity influences 
household borrowing capacity. Specifically, a rise in housing 
prices reduces household leverage and improves household 
balance sheets. As household balance sheets improve, mortgage 
premiums fall and housing demand increases. On the 
consumption side, the improvement in household balance 
sheets also increases the amount that credit-constrained 
consumers can borrow for current consumption. As a result, 
movements in housing prices amplify the effects of underlying 
disturbances to the economy. Housing investment, 
consumption, and output exhibit greater volatility and greater 
comovement than one would obtain in a model with perfect 
capital markets. The model also contains important feedback 
effects in general equilibrium: as housing prices rise and 
balance sheets improve, the increased demand for housing 
raises house prices even further. The rise in house prices causes 
further improvements in balance sheets, which fuel further 
increases in consumption and housing investment, among 
other things. This general-equilibrium feedback mechanism 
provides an additional source of amplification and propagation 
to underlying disturbances to the macroeconomy.
Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe use the model to consider the 
effect of two possible types of financial deregulation that have 
improved household access to capital markets. In the first 
experiment, households can more easily access housing 
collateral for consumption purposes. As housing prices rise, 
households divert more of these gains in housing wealth to 
alternative uses of funds. This reduces the feedback mechanism 
in the economy as well as the volatility of housing prices and 
housing investment, but raises the volatility of overall 
consumption. In the second experiment, the number of credit-
constrained households—households whose borrowing 
capacity is linked to their balance-sheet and hence housing 
equity—is reduced. This experiment strengthens the feedback 
mechanism and raises the volatility of housing prices and 
housing investment, but reduces the volatility of consumption. 
Although these two experiments have opposite implications 
regarding the amplification of housing prices and housing 
investment relative to consumption, the authors suggest that 
the likely effect of deregulation is to dampen housing price 
volatility and increase consumption volatility.
In addition to developing these model implications, the 
paper provides a detailed description of recent developments in 
U.K. financial markets, emphasizing the role of mortgage 
equity withdrawals and changes in retail lending that provide 
support for the aforementioned experiments. The paper also 
provides a vector autoregression (VAR)-based analysis of the 
effect of monetary policy on housing prices, housing 
investment, and consumption. Overall, the study is well-
executed and informative. The authors deserve praise for a 
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 In these equations, all variables may be considered log 
deviations from steady state.   is the real rate of return on 
bonds;   is the rate of return on housing; and   measures 
housing equity, while   represents housing expenditures 
(price times quantity), so that   measures leverage—
housing expenditures relative to housing equity.1  As leverage 
falls, rule-of-thumb households withdraw more equity and 
consume more.
To close the IS curve, the BGG framework specifies a 
positive relationship between the premium on the rate of 
return on housing and household leverage: 
(4) .
Aggregate demand is a weighted average of the expenditure 
components
(5) .





The first term on the right-hand side of equation 7 implies 
that aggregate demand depends on current balance-sheet 
conditions owing to rule-of-thumb consumers. The last term 
implies that aggregate demand also depends on future balance-
sheet conditions owing to the forward-looking nature of 
housing investment decisions. In a more general model,   
might represent all household expenditures that depend on 
external finance premia (for example, consumer durables and 
housing purchases). In either case, current aggregate demand is 
sensitive to both current and future balance-sheet conditions. 
An implication for policymakers is that the entire future path 
of household financial conditions matters for understanding 
the determinants of current aggregate demand. Another 
implication is that financial conditions are measured not 
simply as changes in asset prices, but in terms of the underlying 
strength of the balance sheet. This has obvious implications for 
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well-articulated model that allows one to consider the effect of 
financial market imperfections on housing investment and 
consumption. In my comments, I will focus on a few specific 
issues: how to think about the model’s implications within a 
fairly standard New Keynesian framework, and how well the 
model’s implications fit the facts on hand, with a regard to 
where to go from here.
A Closer Look at the Model
To model financial market imperfections on the household 
side, the authors adopt some sensible simplifying assumptions. 
They artificially divide households into consumers and 
homeowners. As homeowners, households finance the stock of 
both new and existing housing using existing housing equity as 
collateral. As leverage in the housing market rises, households 
face a larger premium on mortgage interest rates. Owing to 
adjustment costs, positive shocks to the economy raise housing 
prices, improve household balance sheets (reduce leverage), 
and reduce mortgage premiums. This mechanism is analogous 
to the financial accelerator mechanism for business-fixed 
investment developed in the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(BGG) framework. To allow for housing price movements to 
affect consumption directly, Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe 
posit a group of credit-constrained households who borrow 
against housing equity. Although it is not explicitly modeled as 
a financial contract, this link between housing prices and 
consumption provides an additional channel through which 
asset prices affect aggregate demand.
The model underlying the analysis of the paper may be 
viewed as a variant of a dynamic New Keynesian framework. 
Although the financial accelerator mechanism has both supply 
and demand effects, the supply-side effects are unlikely to be 
quantitatively important and the basic mechanism can be 
understood by examining the model’s implications for a 
dynamic IS curve. The model allows for three different types of 
spending behavior: permanent-income households who satisfy 
a standard-consumption Euler equation of the form 
(1)        ,
rule-of-thumb households whose consumption is linked to 
equity withdrawals from housing
(2) ,
and housing investment, which satisfies an Euler equation 
motivated by adjustment costs
(3)         .
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To close the model, we need to determine the evolution of 
household net worth, housing prices, and the housing stock, as 
well as the path for real interest rates. This is done in a standard 
fashion following the dynamic New Keynesian framework 
expressed in the BGG model. The key insight here is that, owing 
to leverage in the economy, a positive shock to housing prices 
raises net worth more than housing expenditures, so that  
 is procyclical. According to the model, movements 
in the balance sheet are also persistent and tend to die out more 
slowly than movements in real interest rates. As a result, the 
model amplifies and propagates shocks to monetary policy and 
other sources of fluctuations. How much current versus future 
financial conditions matter depends on the relative weights 
placed on rule-of-thumb consumers and the speed at which 
they may withdraw housing equity for consumption purposes.
Roughly speaking, the policy experiments change the 
relative weight,  , and the relationship between the balance 
sheet and current consumption, captured by the elasticity  . It 
is worth emphasizing that one can consider other experiments 
that imply an improvement in financial conditions. These 
would include a reduction in the monitoring costs incurred on 
housing contracts or an increase in average household leverage. 
The former would most likely dampen the volatility of both 
consumption and housing investment. The latter would 
increase the volatility of both consumption and housing 
investment. In short, specific conclusions regarding the effect 
of financial deregulation will depend on the type considered. 
A Closer Look at the Facts
Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe provide a variety of facts and 
empirical results regarding both the evolution of financial 
markets and the dynamic relationship between housing prices, 
output, consumption, and interest rates. Their study 
documents the volatility of housing prices relative to 
consumption and output (a simple comparison with U.S. data 
suggests that U.K. housing prices are indeed substantially more 
volatile). It also provides a VAR-based analysis of the dynamic 
response of these variables to a monetary policy shock. 
Housing prices and durables consumption exhibit 
substantially more variation than output and nondurables. 
Although suggestive, none of the results here provides direct 
evidence of a financial accelerator mechanism linking housing 
prices to consumption behavior. In particular, any model 
based on adjustment costs would provide positive 
comovement between housing prices, consumption, and 
output in response to real interest rate movements owing to 
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innovations in monetary policy. What is lacking in the analysis 
is a clear identification scheme. One possibility would be to 
estimate directly an IS curve along the lines of the one specified 
above. Here, one could directly test for evidence of household 
balance sheets influencing aggregate demand. Another 
possibility would be to estimate the model via maximum 
likelihood. If financial deregulation has had an important 
influence on the relationship between housing prices and 
consumption, we should expect to see changes in the 
underlying structural parameters consistent with this 
hypothesis.
Perhaps more troubling for the existing model is the lagged 
response of housing prices relative to housing investment and 
durable goods consumption—note that housing prices also lag 
output, which explains their lack of predictive power. This 
timing is clearly at odds with the model’s main mechanism 
whereby a reduction in interest rates causes an immediate 
increase in housing prices and, in the process, provides 
immediate improvements in household balance sheets that are 
then translated into additional movements in aggregate 
demand. It might be possible to rationalize the slow response of 
housing prices through the usual sticky-price mechanisms 
applied to the housing sector. Alternatively, Genesove and 
Mayer (1999) argue that time on the market varies over the 
cycle as house sellers with down-payment constraints seek to 
avoid capital losses. In both cases, expected future 
improvements in balance sheets still provide an amplification 
and propagation mechanism. Households may borrow against 
expected future housing gains or rule-of-thumb consumers 
may exhibit a lagged response if current consumption is tied to 
the current balance sheet. Either way, a richer model is needed 
to characterize fully the joint dynamics of housing prices, 
consumption, and output in response to monetary policy and 
other shocks.
In addition, Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe do not make a 
strong case for financial deregulation as a source of consump-
tion volatility. The additional response of consumption 
that is obtained under either experiment appears to be too 
small to be of serious concern for policymakers. This finding 
is at odds with the spirit of the paper and with what seems to 
be the tone of discussion among U.K. policymakers regarding 
this issue. The paper provides the impression that financial 
deregulation has indeed increased consumption volatility. 
Neither the model nor the facts provided make a strong 
case for this statement, however. Whether the model can be 
calibrated to provide a bigger effect from financial deregulation 
and whether additional facts can be provided in support of 
such a hypothesis remain to be seen. I look forward to such 
additional research. Endnotes
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1.  For expository purposes, these expressions are simplifications of 
the actual model specification used by the authors.
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